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SLegal Research
The "Official" Texas Court Reports:
The Rest of the Story
By James Hambleton and Jim Paulsen
n the January 1986 issue of the Texas Bar Journal, this
column recounted the checkered tale of the official Texas
court reports, from the birth of the Texas Reports in the first
State Legislature, to their mysterious death at the hands of the
Legislature in 1963, and their equally mysterious resurrection
by the most recent session, in the form of the Texas Govern-
ment Code. The authors have since been deluged with reader
mail on the subject, and have decided to share excerpts from
both letters.
Chief Justice Calvert was able to shed considerable light on
the death in 1963 of the Texas Reports and Texas Criminal
Reports. As the reader may (but probably does not) recall,
funding for the official court reports ceased in 1963. On the
other hand, legislation that would have given the Supreme
Court and Court of Criminal Appeals power to designate any
publication (i.e., West Publishing Company's Southwestern
Reporter) as the "official" source for opinions failed to pass. As
a result, the state was left with the anomalous situation of an
official source for court opinions mandated by statute, but no
money for printing or salaries.
As Chief Justice Calvert explains it, interest in abolition of
the official court reports was brought into focus in 1961 by the
decision of L.K. Smoot, long-time official reporter of the Texas
Supreme Court, that it was time to retire. Smoot, who had
served as reporter since 1932, went out with a flourish,
announcing: "I am 86 years old, have been with the court 69
years, and don't want to stay here too long like I have seen some
of the judges do."
L.K. Smoot's retirement led the Texas Supreme Court to
reexamine the necessity for official reports. As Chief Justice
Calvert recalls the events:
"I had long since decided that publication of the Supreme
Court Reports and the Texas Criminal Reports was a
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needless waste of public funds; however, to confirm my
suspicion I sent out letters to all district and appellate
judges inquiring whether in their research they used those
official reports or West's Southwestern Reporter. As I
recall, the replies were virtually unanimous in reporting
use only of the Southwestern Reporter. As an additional
precaution, I sought distribution information from the
Secretary of State, whose duty it was to dispose of the
printed reports. I was advised that free books were sent
to county and district judges, and that books were avail-
able for purchase by lawyers and law firms, but that only
a very few big law firms bought them."
In an earlier article, we traced the history
of the Texas Reports. The authors have since
been deluged with reader mail on the subject,
and have decided to share excerpts from both
letters.
As the earlier article explained, this impetus to eliminate the
official court reports took concrete form in Senate Bill 123,
introduced in 1963. This bill passed the Senate without serious
opposition, but hit a brick wall in the House of Representatives.
The official records of the Texas Legislature reveal no cause for
the demise of S.B. 123. As Chief Justice Calvert explains it,
though, the House of Representatives was persuaded to kill
S.B. 123 out of concern for the reporter of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, who would have been out of a job had the
bill passed. The reporter who replaced Smoot in the Texas
Supreme Court, by the way, was hired with the understanding
that the court was in the process of trying to eliminate his
position.
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One question still remains. If the Legislature did not elimi-
nate the official court reports, why did funding cease? Again,
Chief Justice Calvert offers an answer: Despite the failure of the
House of Representatives to get rid of the official court reports,
Gov. John Connally's office was convinced they should go. The
governor exercised his line-item veto power, and funding for
printing and salaries stopped. An accompanying explanatory
note read:
"The Appellate Court Reports are a duplication of a
service already provided by other court reports which
offer a quicker and more usable reference for use of State
Agencies. Even if this service were necessary the funds
appropriated for the printing and distributing of the
reports are inadequate to accomplish the full purpose."
As Justice Calvert puts it, the official reports were now
"comatose." Why did a subsequent Legislature not pull the
plug? Some moves were made in 1965 to designate the South-
western Reporter as the "official source for court opinions." As
Chief Justice Calvert recalls it, some fears were expressed that
this would give West Publishing Company a monopoly, with
the result that they could raise their prices at will. As a result,
the move to clean up the statutes died. Of course, West Publish-
ing Company already had a practical monopoly on court
reports in 1965. And as any law librarian can testify, the pres-
ence of the official court report legislation on the books has not
deterred West from raising prices at will ever since. See, e.g.,
Hambleton, West's Texas Cases: A good New Product, But at a
Price, 46 Tex. B.J. 1318 (1983).
Chief Justice Calvert's explanation does dispel much of the
mystery surrounding the "death" of the official court reports in
1963. But what of their resurrection in the Texas Government
Code, passed by the most recent Legislature? Again, the
authors are grateful to a reader, Steve Collins, assistant director
of the Legal Division, Texas Legislative Council, for some
valuable explanation.
To recapitulate, sections 22.008 and 22.104 of the new Texas
Government Code mandate official publication of the decisions
of the state's two high courts. The dead-letter statutes, in
essence, were spruced up and placed right in the middle of the
new Code.
One of the goals of Texas' continuing codification program is
to eliminate "repealed, duplicative, unconstitutional, expired,
executed, and otherwise ineffective provisions." Tex. Gov't
Code §1.001(b)(3). Since the provisions for official court
reports have not been funded for 22 years or so, the authors
raised the question of why the statutory provisions were not
considered "ineffective."
Collins' letter clarifies the reasons behind the decision of the
Texas Legislative Council to include the court reporter provi-
sions in the new Government Code. Explaining that there is a
difference between an "ineffective" statute and a "legally inef-
fective" statute, he adds:
"However quaint, curious, and anomalous it may be for
the law to require publication of an official reporter, but
for the Legislature not to fund it, it is nonetheless the law
and does have at least one continuing purpose: should
the Legislature choose to fund these reporters, it may
really resurrect them with a simple appropriation. To
repeal the statute as ineffective would certainly have
substantive effect; since any appropriation requires pre-
existing statutory authority. ... The Legislature under
those circumstances would both have to enact a law and
make an appropriation in order to restart the series.
If you wish, conceive of this law as Sleeping Beauty.
Prince Charming, i.e., the Legislature, may awaken her
with merely a kiss. If she were truly dead, he would have
to provide for or await her physical rebirth. If you will
pardon the pun, the difference is substantial."
Certainly, judgment calls must be made by the Texas Legisla-
tive Council. Their statutory mandate, after all, is not a model
of clarity. See Tex. Gov't Code §323.007. One may question
why a statute for which no funding has been provided for many
years is retained, on the chance that the Legislature may one
day change its mind, while a statute declared unconstitutional
may be dropped from a code, despite the fact that our state
Supreme Court has also been known on occasion to change its
mind.
Nonetheless, Steve Collins deserves thanks, not only for
demonstrating that there was indeed a method underlying the
apparent madness in the Texas Government Code, but for
contributing perhaps the kindest metaphor ("Prince Charm-
ing") used in conjunction with the Texas Legislature, at least in
recent history. Collins and Chief Justice Calvert have done
much to dispel the confusion surrounding the murky history of
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SAnnual Report
The State Commission
On Judicial Conduct Annual Report
To the Legislature for Fiscal Year 1985
(Editor's Note: The Texas Government Code requires
that the Judicial Conduct Commission's Annual Report
be published in the Bar Journal. See Tex. Govt. Code
Ann. § 33.005 (Vernon 1986). Herewith is the 1985 annual
report).
Role of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct
With the addition of retired judges and masters during FY
1985, the State Commission on Judicial Conduct (hereinafter
called Commission) assumed jurisdiction over more than 3,000
judicial officers in Texas.
The Commission's primary role is threefold:
* to preserve the integrity of all judges in the state;
* to ensure public confidence in the judiciary; and
* to encourage judges to maintain high standards of both
professional and personal conduct.
In obtaining those objectives, the Commission in FY 1985
disposed of 390 complaints, a 15 percent increase over 1984. A
variety of sanctions were employed, ranging from public repri-
mands to private admonitions. In nine cases, judges chose to
resign or retire rather than encounter further Commission
action. Overall, the Commission ordered sanctions in 20.9
percent of complaints in 1985, compared to 14 percent in 1984.
In other instances, the Commission dismissed cases wherein the
judge initiated corrective action or improved procedures or
policies.
Those who currently come under Commission purview
include justices on the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of
Criminal Appeals; justices on all Courts of Appeals; judges on
District Courts, including retired judges and masters; judges of
County Courts and County Courts-At-Law; Justices of the
Peace; and Municipal Judges.
Authority for Operation of the
State Commission on Judicial Conduct
The Texas Constitution, Article V, Section 1-a, and Vernon's
Texas Civil Statutes, Article 5966a, are the source of authority
under which the Commission operates.
It was in 1965 that the people of Texas approved the Constitu-
tional Amendment that first created the Commission, known at
that time as the Judicial Qualifications Commission. Texas was
the second state to perceive the need of an agency to which the
public could turn in the event of judicial misconduct. Now,
every state in the union has such a judicial disciplinary agency.
Through the past two decades, additional Constitutional
Amendments have changed the name of the Commission, and
have expanded its jurisdiction and enlarged its powers. In 1984,
Texans authorized the inclusion of retired judges and masters in
Commission jurisdiction, expanded disciplinary alternatives
available to the Commission, and clarified procedures for
removal. Representational makeup of the Commission itself
was also expanded to include a county court-at-law judge and a
municipal judge in the group of citizens, lawyers, and judges
who comprise the Commission. The Constitutional changes
added three categories of improper judicial conduct: the willful
or persistent violation of the rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court of Texas; incompetence in performing the duties of
office; and willful violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The public's attitude toward the work of the Commission was
evidenced by the fact that this amendment passed by the largest
majority of any of the several amendments offered. The amend-
ment affecting the Commission became effective on Jan. 1,
1985, four months into FY 1985.
Under the provisions of the Constitution and the statute
currently in operation, the Commission may dismiss a com-
plaint or may order a public or private warning, a public or
private admonition, or a public or private reprimand. A judge
may be required to undergo physical or psychiatric examina-
tion, or to obtain additional education. A judge charged with a
felony criminal offense or a misdemeanor involving miscon-
duct in office may be suspended with or without pay. The
Commission may seek the removal or censure of a judge.
Subpoena power is provided to enable the Commission to carry
out its work.
Delineated as cause for the removal of a judge is willful or
persistent conduct that is clearly inconsistent with the proper
performance of duties or casts public discredit upon the judici-
ary or the administration of justice. Improper conduct includes,
but is not limited to: failure to execute the business of the court
in a timely manner, willful violation of a provision of the Texas
Penal Code or the Code of Judicial Conduct, persistent or
willful violation of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Texas,
and incompetence in the performance of the duties of office.
The Commission also condemns the actions of judges who
abuse the authority inherent in their positions or who are rude
or disrespectful to those appearing in their courts.
The Commission does not have authority to change the
decision of any court or to act as an appellate review board. The
Commission does not give legal advice. The Commission does
not act upon allegations against a judge for reaching a legal
decision, making findings of fact, or applying the law as the
judge understands it.
Emphasized in both the Constitution and the statute is a
requirement for confidentiality concerning the work of the
Commission, based upon the Commission's mandate to uphold
the public's confidence in the judiciary.
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Procedures of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct
The Constitutional and statutory provisions described in the
section on "Authority," together with the Rules and Regula-
tions for the Removal or Retirement of Judges promulgated by
the Texas Supreme Court, make up the procedural framework
within which the Commission operates.
A file is initiated by a written complaint. Since the Commis-
sion's work is confidential in nature and not widely publicized,
a telephone inquiry is often the first step in filing a complaint. If
the caller has possible grounds for a complaint, he is sent an
outline of policies and procedures, together with an affidavit
form. While the complaint may be sworn to, the Commission
also considers letters and news clippings as the basis for opening
a file. Occasionally, the Commission itself may be the com-
plainant in a case where the actions of a judge are reported by
the news media and appear to be possible misconduct, or
appear to bring discredit upon the judiciary.
When a complaint is received, a file is established and
reviewed by the executive director. The case is analyzed and
assigned to a staff attorney-investigator, who likewise reviews
the allegations. That preliminary screening determines whether
further investigation is expedient. Many complaints are in real-
ity against law enforcement officers, corrections officials, law-
yers, clerks, or even the federal judiciary. In these cases, the
complainant is notified that the Commission has no jurisdic-
tion. In other cases, the complainant may be disgruntled with a
judge's decision, particularly in highly emotionally charged
litigation such as custody or criminal trials. Such matters are
properly matters for appeal, and the judge's good faith deci-
sion, even if it is in error, is not judicial misconduct. In all cases,
the complainant is notified by mail immediately that his com-
plaint has been received; if it is vague in its allegations, the
complainant may be asked for more specific detail, or staff may
request additional documentation.
If, after preliminary screening and investigation, it still
appears possible that misconduct may have occurred, the judge
may be requested to respond to specific inquiries in writing.
The judge may be requested to provide legal authority for his
actions, or to state whether the allegation is accurate, and if
not, in what way it is not accurate. Facts may be further
investigated on-site, or through telephone interviews, or both.
Each complaint is briefed by staff and presented to the Com-
mission as a whole when it meets in Austin every other month.
The Commission may at that time request additional investiga-
tion, or it may ask that the judge provide further information.
The Commission may also dismiss the case at its first presenta-
tion, in which case both the judge and the complainant are so
advised.
The judge may be invited to appear informally to have
dialogue with the Commission, or to explain his actions. If a
judge elects to appear, the meeting with the Commission is
closed, unless the judge chooses to open the meeting. The judge
may invite friends or family, or legal counsel if he wishes. If the
judge wishes to introduce the testimony of others, it must be
written. The judge may testify only under oath.
In a situation where a judge is suspended because of pending
criminal charges, the Commission may decide to postpone
action on the matter until after the conclusion of the criminal
proceedings. At that time, the Commission would then under-
take its own examination of the situation. The Commission
would not seek to determine the guilt or innocence of the judge
beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather whether, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, the judge had brought discredit upon
the judicial system by his actions or engaged in willful or
persistent conduct which is clearly inconsistent with the proper
performance of his duties.
The Commission may choose to dismiss a case for a variety
of reasons - lack of available proof, outside the jurisdiction of
the Commission, the judge acted within his discretion, or that
the judge's actions did not rise to the level of judicial miscon-
duct. Sometimes, corrective action is taken by the judge which
will avoid the imposition of sanctions.
A private admonition is the least onerous of all sanctions that
may be imposed by the Commission. An admonition is a letter
to the judge suggesting that another action may be a better
solution to the particular situation.
A private warning is stronger than an admonition, and a
private reprimand is stronger still, spelling out a finding of
judicial misconduct, and enumerating the reasons that such
conduct is improper or brings discredit upon the judiciary or
the administration of justice.
A public admonition or warning would be the same, except
that a public admonition or warning would be released to the
press.Most serious of all these sanctions is the public reprimand,
which is issued when the Commission believes that a judge has
committed serious misconduct, and the judiciary would be best
served by a public statement of the judge's misconduct.
Should the Commission determine that formal proceedings
for removal are in order, the veil of confidentiality is lifted upon
the convening of a formal hearing, and the hearing would be
public. The Commission would seek the appointment of a
master by the Supreme Court. After a public hearing, with the
master presiding, the master would make findings of fact. The
Commission would then dismiss, censure, or forward the find-
ings with a recommendation for removal to the Supreme Court.
In the event of a recommendation of removal, the Supreme
Court would appoint a seven-judge tribunal made up of justices
from the Courts of Appeal throughout the state. The tribunal is
chosen by lot by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Appeal
from a decision of the tribunal would be directly to the Supreme
Court, which would consider the case under the substantial
evidence rule.
Judges who are removed or retired by the Supreme Court
may be prohibited from holding judicial office in the future.
In every case, the complainant is notified of the conclusion of
his case. The statute also specifies and limits the manner in
which a complainant may be notified: the complaint has been
dismissed; appropriate action has been taken, the nature of
which may not be disclosed; or, formal proceedings have been
instituted. In situations where a public sanction has been taken,
the complainant is provided with a copy of that public docu-
ment.
Commission procedures are mapped in the flow chart,
Exhibit A, on the following pages.
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formal proceedings
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Annual Statistical Data
In FY 1985, the Commission disposed of 390 cases, a 15
percent increase over the 343 disposed of during FY 1984. Of the
cases disposed of in FY1985, the Commission ordered sanctions
in a total of 77, or 20.8 percent, an increase of 6.8 percent over













*Judges counted in this category resigned in lieu
of further Commission action. The Commis-
sion appreciates that the majority of judges
who resign or retire do so to conclude an
honorable judicial career.
Examples of Allegations of Improper Conduct
That the judiciary shares the foibles of all humanity is amply
demonstrated by a scanning of the typical and atypical com-
plaints received in the offices of the Commission. Without
revealing specifics, the following examples of judicial miscon-
duct were among those reviewed by the Commission in FY
1985:
-A judge advised a defendant to make good on bad checks
or go to jail, when the cases on those checks were not
before the judge.
-A judge used his judicial office to intimidate an opposing
litigant in a civil case in which the judge represented one of
the litigants.
-A judge ruled in a case in which he and his son had a
financial interest.
-A judge refused to answer questions before a judicial
proceeding on the grounds that his answer might incrimi-
nate him.
-A judge solicited a litigant to provide beer for a party.
-A judge accepted a bribe.
-A judge acted on a matter that was properly before
another court.
-A judge failed to handle the business of his court, includ-
ing accounting for county funds paid through his court.
-A judge testified, as a character witness, without sub-
poena, in behalf of a friend in a criminal trial.
-A judge abused his power to arrest.
-A judge was acting as a collection agency for a business in
violation of statute, and ordered a litigant to bring his
money or go to jail.
-A judge aired his dispute with another public official in
the press.
-A judge traded sexual favors for a favorable verdict.
-A judge called a district attorney a liar.
-A judge held a litigant in contempt for threatening to
complain to the Commission.
-A judge was drunk on the bench.
-A judge got into an altercation involving fisticuffs.
-A judge had a litigant arrested for contempt when the
litigant failed to pay a money judgment in a civil case.
-A judge harrassed a witness the day after a trial with
threats of prosecution for perjury.
Examples of Judicial Conduct Considered Proper
Often, emotionally involved litigants experience difficulty in
determining the difference between judicial error and judicial
misconduct. The limits of judicial misconduct are drawn by
rules of court, the statutes and codes of ethics under which
judges must conduct the business of the court; judicial error, on
the other hand, is a decision that a reviewing tribunal deter-
mines was wrong. A "wrong" decision is not misconduct.
Without revealing specifics, the following types of conduct
were considered by the Commission not to be misconduct in
1985.
-A judge ruled a death a suicide when some evidence of
foul play was noted.
-A judge refused an ex parte conversation with a litigant.
-A judge did not require prepayment of court costs in gold.
-A judge refused to dismiss a case on grounds that it had
been filed by an out-of-state corporation.
-A judge granted managing conservatorship of a child to a
parent when some evidence had been introduced that the
parent had abused the child.
-A judge refused to rule in a question involving title to land
when his court had no jurisdiction over title to land.
-A judge would not instruct a criminal defendant in how to
be an effective pro se attorney.
-A judge was conducting the business of his court in his
commercial business establishment when the county did
not provide him a court room or clerical assistance.
-A judge granted a summary judgment on issues of law,
thus denying a litigant his "day in court."
-A judge refused to listen to several witnesses who would
testify to the same fact.
-A judge believed a witness who was lying.
-A judge was staying in another county but intended his
county of residence to be the county where he served.
-A judge entered a one-sided property judgment in a
divorce.
-A judge was involved in a civil dispute over his own
property line.
-A judge found a defendant guilty of speeding when the
defendant proved his speedometer was not working prop-
erly.
Legislative Concerns of the Commission
During FY 1985, the Commission considered some situations
wherein the action of a judge raised considerable public outcry,
yet may arguably have been within the letter of the law, or in
which the law was unclear. Other complaints involved actions
of a judge that occurred within a gray area of the law, or where
the law was apparently inconsistent. In some of these instances,
the Commission reserved action, determining instead to call
these issues to the attention of the Legislature:
(1) There is a question as to the propriety of certain "inno-
vative" sentencing practices by a number of judges at different
levels throughout the state, who impose as a condition of
probation a requirement that a criminal defendant pay monies
to a "fund" administered by the court or to specific charities
designated by the court. The required payments are distinct and
apart from any other fine, restitution, reparation or probation
fees authorized by statute. The practice in question may be
gaining in popularity and could have a substantial effect in
reducing income into state and local coffers from traditional
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fines and courts costs. The practice is based on the provisions of
sections 6(a) of both Articles 42.12 and 42.13 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure which provide, in the pertinent parts, that,
"Terms and conditions of probation may include, but shall not
be limited to..." (it is also noted that Article 45.54 of the Code
contains a related provision which allows the justice to require
that a defendant, "...comply with any other reasonable condi-
tion...").
In one instance, in a county which is not among the state's
more populous counties, the Commission observed that more
than $188,000 was accumulated in a fund which was available
for distribution by the judge. The money was being used for
such diverse items as salary supplements, equipment for the
sheriff's office, scholarships for county personnel to attend
continuing education programs, rape crisis centers, computer
equipment and software, consultant fees, etc. Probationers
may be required to make one-time, or continuing, payments. It
is obvious that the practice in question not only makes large
amounts of money available to the judiciary for discretionary
distribution, but does so in direct competition with the estab-
lished system of fines and court costs and to the detriment of
traditional budget-making responsibilities at the state and local
level.
How far does a judge's discretion extend in establishing
conditions for probation? In the past, the Legislature has spec-
ified a fee for probation, and a contribution to Crime Stoppers,
as acceptable conditions for probation. A current attorney
general's opinion JM-307 states that contributions are permissi-
ble so long as the contribution is related to protection of the
public or rehabilitation. If a fine is ordered, and a contribution
as well, may the contribution exceed the fine? May a judge
order a contribution in lieu of a fine, so that money which
should have gone into the county's general fund to defray the
costs of government goes instead to a private charity or cultural
organization? May a judge order a contribution to a fund which
he controls, and which is used to supplement county salaries or
provide government services not budgeted by the appropriate
legislative authority?
(2) Through utilization of the electorate as its selection
method for judges, Texas subjects its judiciary each election
year to public scrutiny, and, occasionally, to scurrilous attack.
Politically embattled incumbent judges face the choice of
responding with silence, possibly suffering defeat at the polls,
or responding in kind, dropping the robe of judicial demeanor
the better to engage in mud slinging.
May a candidate for judicial office running against an incum-
bent judge pursue a course of hard-hitting campaign advertis-
ing, while the incumbent judge is held to a judicial ethic of
understatement and restraint7 How far may an incumbent
judge go in public attack upon his opponent7 Should all judicial
candidates be required to honor judicial ethics? A bitter cam-
paign does not enhance the integrity of the judiciary as a whole,
yet the Commission has no authority over a candidate who is
not yet a judge.
In Kentucky, when a person announces as a candidate for
judge, he comes under the jurisdiction of the judicial discipline
agency, so that both parties in these races are held to a high level
of judicial ethics in the conduct of the race.
The integrity of the judiciary suffers whether or not the
charges hurled in a heated political campaign are truthful. Each
election year, the Commission receives complaints that incum-
bent judges are engaging in unfair political practices in their re-
election campaigns.
(3) As mentioned in previous annual reports, the Commis-
sion desires clarification of its authority to afford judges an
opportunity to appear at Commission meetings prior to the
initiation of formal proceedings. Virtually since the Commis-
sion came into being, it has invited judges in appropriate cases,
to appear informally to respond to allegations of misconduct.
In many instances, the informal appearance by a judge has
enabled the Commission to dispose of a complaint in a more
timely and effective manner than would otherwise have been
possible. Moreover, even though the appearance is informal,
the judge's rights are protected since the judge can be, and often
is, represented by counsel. Then the 68th Legislature in 1983
passed House Bill 44, which made some comprehensive changes
to the statutory provisions governing Commission operations.
One clause of that rather extensive amendment has introduced
some confusion into the law and appears to be in conflict with
other provisions of existing law as well as with constitutional
due process requirements. While the Commission believes that
the clause in question does not preclude the long established
practice of informal appearances, clarifying legislation would
be in order. The Commission was gratified to note that during
the last Legislative Session, companion bills were introduced in
both the House and the Senate (HB# 1483 by Tejeda, and SB#
701 by Mauzy) in an effort to insure that the statutory provi-
sions were clear and in conformity with constitutional due
process requirements. Although no opposition to either bill was
observed, the legislative session ended prior to passage of either
bill. The Commission appreciated the legislative efforts and
requests their continuation in the next session.
The Composition of the Commission
Due to the change in the representation on the Commission
that occurred with implementation of the new Constitutional
amendment, 12 members are currently serving on the Commis-
sion. One appellate judge position will be eliminated when the
t Our ExpeienceWith
Property Settlement Loans
That Realy Pays Off.
When your clients come to
you with questions on loans
involving equity recovery
for investors or equity dis-
tribution in a divorce set-
tlement, give them your
best advice. Send them to
First Union Mortgage.
At First Union Mort-
gage, we have 25 years of
experience in dealing with
loans involving property
settlements. Our Loan Of-
ficers can give your clients
expert advice. And quick
decisions on loan approv-
als. Less red tape. And a
shorter waiting period for




has an established reputa-
tion as a national second-
mortgage lender. With
offices in 30 states.
Come to the company
with a proven reputation




less waiting time on ap-






A Subsidiary of First Union National Bank, Charlotte, N. C.
September1986 Texas Bar Journal 849
incumbent's term expires, bringing the Commission back down
to a membership of 11. Serving on staggered six-year terms will
be one justice of a Court of Appeals, one district judge, one
county court-at-law judge, one justice of the peace, and one
municipal court judge, all appointed by the Supreme Court of
Texas. In addition, the Board of Directors of the State Bar of
Texas appoints two members of the State Bar, each of whom
has practiced for at least 10 consecutive years. Finally, the
governor appoints four citizens who are not lawyers or judges
and who are at least 30 years of age.
Judge John Boyd of Amarillo, associate justice of the Court of
Appeals, Seventh Supreme Judicial District, is currently serv-
ing his second term as chairman of the Commission. He has
served as chairman of the Judicial Section of the State Bar of
Texas and was recipient of the Presidential Citation of the State
Bar in 1979. A graduate of the American Judicial Academy and
the National College of the State Judiciary, he has served as
faculty advisor for the National College of the State Judiciary
and as an instructor in criminal law for the Texas College of the
Judiciary.
Commissioners for FY1985 are as follows:
John T. Boyd, Chairman
Associate Justice, 7th Court of Appeals
Amarillo, Texas
Robert Parsley, Vice Chairman
Attorney
Houston, Texas









William E. Junnell, Associate Justice
14th Court of Appeals
Houston, Texas




139th Judicial District Court
Edinburg, Texas
W. Jack Richburg











During FY 1985, the Honorable Harry Hopkins of Weather-
ford was appointed to an appellate bench and therefore was no
longer eligible for service as a district judge. Judge Kirkpatrick
and Judge Walters were appointed in response to the implemen-
tation of the Constitutional Amendment, joining the Commis-
sion in early 1985.
Commission Staff
Staff of the Commission is headed by Robert Flowers, execu-
tive director, who has served since the retirement of the pre-
vious director in 1983. A graduate of Texas A&M University
and the University of Texas School of Law, he began his career
in private practice and joined the staff of attorney general of
Texas, where he served as chief of the Enforcement Division.
Thereafter he served as director of the Criminal Justice Division
in the Governor's Office.
Additional staff membes are:
Bill Hornung, General Counsel
Ralph Pearson, Staff Attorney
Mary Ellen Keith, Case Investigator/Attorney
Terri Crites, Executive Secretary
Shelley Einck, Administrative Assistant
LET CAPITOL COMMERCE REPORTER
SOLVE YOUR PROBLEMS CONCERNING:
* FRANCHISE TAX INFO .UCC FILING SERVICE
" CHARTER SERVICE UCC SEARCHES
. FILING ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
FOR PROMPT, EFFICIENT SERVICE CALL 512/443-2992
OR OUR NEW TEXAS WATS NUMBER 800-252-9335
OR WRITE P.O. Box 1572, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78767
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The Lawyer's Protector Plan
Takes Action
This "class" action takes the form of associating with an insurance carrier which has
satisfied its commitment to attorneys for over 25 years and has pledged to continue
needed coverage for all eligible attorneys.
The Lawyer's Protector Plan offers all eligible attorneys professional liability insurance
underwritten by Continental Casualty Company, one of the CNA Insurance Compa-
nies. CNA is one of the largest insurance organizations in America with over 25 years of
professional liability experience, assets in excess of $11 billion, and a proven record of
commitment and stability in satisfying professional liability needs-despite the malprac-
tice insurance crisis.
Join The "Class" Action
Contact your local Lawyer's Protector Plan Administrator to learn all the facts about this
professional liability program and to determine if you are eligible. It could be one of the
most important investments of your professional life.
CNA
For All the Commitments You Make®
Your State Administrator:
The Sid Murray Company
5959 S. Staples
P.O. Box 6900







Sponsored by State Bar of Texas
For information: 52/463-1429
4-5
Texas Rules of Criminal
Evidence
Hyatt Regency - Austin





Four Seasons - Houston




Worthington - Fort Worth










Practice Skills Course -
Litigation
Worthington - Fort Worth




Hilton Palacio Del Rio - San Antonio
Sponsored by State Bar of Texas




LBJ Auditorium - Austin
Sponsored by U.T. School of Law
For information: 512/471-3663
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Using Paralegals
For Profit and Productivity
Hilton Hotel Riverside - New Orleans




Park Lane - New York





Plaza of the Americas - Dallas




Plaza of the Americas - Dallas




Advanced Oil, Gas & Mineral
Law
Wyndham - San Antonio
Sponsored by State Bar of Texas
For information: 52/463-1429
Law and Medicine IV:
Pulmonary/Respiratory
Systems
Fairmont - New Orleans







St. Anthony Hotel-San Antonio
Sponsored by MABA of Texas
For information: 214/368-2944
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Fall Workshop for the Office
And Trial Practitioner
Central Jury Room - Dallas County
Courthouse









Antitrust Law Short Course
Westin - Dallas












La Mansion del Rio - San Antonio




Worthington - Fort Worth










Roosevelt Hotel - New York




Sponsored by State Bar of Texas
For information: 512/463-1429
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Company, a subsidiary of the
Coastal Corporation, is an
interstate natural gas
transmission company based
in Colorado Springs, Colo-
rado. We have immediate
need for two attorneys.
GENERAL
ATTORNEY
2-4 years experience in gen-
eral business or contract law
is required. This individual
will be responsible for advis-
ing management concerning
natural gas transportation,





2-4 years of civil trial exper-
ience is required. This indi-
vidual will handle complex
commercial litigation and
related negotiations in sev-
eral states.
Ideal candidates will have a
superior academic record
and natural gas pipeline
experience. These positions
offer a salary commensurate
with experience, advance-
ment opportunity and cor-
porate benefits.
Please send your resume
including salary require-




328A,RO. Box 1087, Colorado
Springs, CO 80944. We are an
equal opportunity employer
m/f/h/v.
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Professional Responsibility
Substantive Trust Fund Violations
Note from State Bar General Counsel Steven Peterson: On July 25,
1986, your general counsel's office conducted a one-day workshop
for grievance committee chairpersons. Martin E. Richter, an
assistant general counsel and attorney in charge of the Dallas/Fort
Worth Regional Office, presented an excellent paper on substantive
trust fund violations which I think should be shared with all Texas
attorneys. Richter's presentation is reproduced in its entirety.
Introduction
Throughout our careers as lawyers, we
have delved into and waded through the
mystical gray areas of what is generally
termed "The Law." We have earned our
living trying to persuade the courts,
opposing counsel and all who will listen
that our shade of gray is the purest, while
at the same time, we diligently search for
some absolute: something black or some-
thing white. No other area of the law was
framed from its inception with such fun-
damental absolutes in mind as Disciplin-
ary Rule 9-102.
Enabling Provisions
Art. X, Sec. 38, of the State Bar Rules
requires that lawyers engaged in the
practice of law in the state of Texas shall
maintain a separate trust account or
accounts. DR 9-102 establishes the mini-
mum standards for preserving the iden-
tity of funds and property belonging to a
client. This rule mandates that all client
funds paid to a lawyer or law firm must
be deposited in one or more identifiable
accounts in the state where the law office
is situated. Furthermore, no funds
belonging to a lawyer or law firm may be
deposited in these accounts. There are
two and only two exceptions to this rule:
(1) Lawyer or law firm funds that
are reasonably sufficient to pay bank
charges, and
(2) Funds by a client to a lawyer or
law firm as an advance for costs and
expenses.
Additionally, DR 9-02(B)(3) man-
dates that the attorney must maintain
complete records of such account for a
period of five years after disposition of
the underlying matter. The attorney
must also render appropriate account-
ings to his client regarding those funds.
As can be seen by the most simplistic
analysis of this rule, attorneys are placed
in a fiduciary capacity, and must sepa-
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rate funds and property belonging to a
client from their own. Making the dis-
tinction regarding who the funds and
property belong to and, therefore, where
the funds and property must be depos-
ited, has generated considerable contro-
versy resulting in a number of
disciplinary proceedings.
Common Violations
A discussion of trust fund violations
requires a division of the violations into
two basic categories: monetary and non-
monetary.
Monetary
A. Fee Advances - As a general rule,
fee advances must be placed in the
attorney trust account. However, the
application of the fee advance rule
depends on the characterization of the
funds passed from the client to the
attorney. That is, whether the fund is an
advance on the attorney's fee or whether
it is a true retainer.
The Texas Bar Journal in April 1978
printed Opinion 391, distinguishing four
different fact situations pertaining to the
characterization of client funds:
(1) A lawyer agrees to represent a
client on an hourly basis that will be
billed monthly. The client is required
to pay some amount at the beginning
of the representation, however. This
constitutes an advanced fee, and
since, until completely earned, it
belongs in part to the lawyer and in
part to the client, it must be deposited
in a trust account.
(2) In the second situation the same
agreement exists except that part of
the advance is a retainer that will be
applied to the hourly work done by
the lawyer but will not be refunded
even if it exceeds the work done. It
was determined that this non-refund-
able retainer belongs exclusively to
the lawyer and may be placed in his
personal account. The rest of the
advance, however, belongs partly to
the client and, therefore, must go into
a trust account.
(3) The third situation is that a law-
yer agrees to represent a client for a
reasonable fee to be determined and
billed at the end of the representation.
The lawyer demands up front, how-
ever, a "retainer" that will be applied
against the final fee. This appears to
be a refundable advance, not entirely
belonging to the lawyer when it came
into his possession, and therefore, it
must be placed in a trust account.
(4) Under the final fact pattern, the
lawyer charges the client a flat fee
payable in advance. No understand-
ing is reached between the lawyer and
client about the fee's refundability.
The opinion, emphasizing the absence
of a guarantee that the lawyer would
be entitled ultimately to the whole
advance, concluded that it must be
deposited in a trust account.
B. Commingling - An attorney com-
mingles funds when he intermingles the
client's money with his own or his firm's
funds, and its separate identity is lost so
that it could be used for the attorney's
expense or be subject to claims of the
attorney's creditors. Black v. State Bar,
368 P.2d 118 (Cal. 1962). In Black, the
attorney was disciplined when he
received a check jointly payable to him-
self and to his client, in which he had an
interest for his fees. The attorney depos-
ited the check into his own account and
failed to separate his agreed interest "at
the earliest possible time."
Similarly, if the attorney has several
accounts at the same bank, and as a result
of personal financial difficulties, the
bank attaches one of his accounts; i.e.,
trust account, the attorney must arrange
his personal finances so that the attach-
ment is withdrawn immediately.
Vaughan v. State Bar, 494 P.2d 1257
(Cal. 1972). In Vaughan, the attorney
took no action for more than a year,
thereby allowing his personal funds to be
free for use, while allowing the client's
trust funds to function as security for his
personal obligations. The court in
Vaughan also stated that it is not neces-
sary that there be a conversion or even
misuse of funds to constitute commin-
gling and violate DR 9-102.
Additionally, it is not necessary that
client funds be actually in danger of loss
or misappropriation in order for the
attorney to be subject to discipline. The
courts justify this result because the
appearance of impropriety undermines
public confidence in our profession.
Commission on Professional Ethics v.
White, 209 N.W.2d11 (Iowa 1973).
C. Conversion - Conversion, as dis-
tinguished from commingling, is the mis-
appropriation of the client's funds for the
attorney's use. Most authorities appear
to agree that conversion (misappropria-
tion) is perhaps the most serious breach
of an attorney's duty owed to a client,
and such action warrants severe disci-
plinary sanctions. Following are exam-
ples of misappropriation:
(1) Writing personal checks on a
client's trust account. Dayton Bar
Ass'n v. Hertzog, 436 N.E.2d 1037
(1982), cert. denied.
(2) Using a client's trust funds to
cover business expenses, debts and
overhead. In re Simpson, 645 P.2d
1233 (Alaska 1982) (bar dues);
Edmondson v. State Bar, 625 P.2d
812 (Cal. 1981) (business debts); Gor-
don v. State Bar, 647 P.2d 137 (Cal.
1982) (overhead and operating
expenses).
(3) Withdrawing funds from the
trust account of one client to meet
obligations incurred by another cli-
ent. Gordon v. State Bar, 647 P.2d
137 (Cal. 1982).
(4) Check kiting, or drawing
checks on recently deposited checks
before the deposited checks have
cleared. In re Austin, 333 N.W.2d 633
(Minn. 1983); Virginia State Bar
Opinion, 183 (1980).
In order to establish that misap-
propriation has in fact occurred, the
grievance committee does not need to
find that the attorney's conduct was will-
ful, intentional, or fraudulent. Archer v.
State, 548 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.
El Paso 1977). The mere fact that an
attorney's trust account balance falls
below the amount deposited supports a
finding of misappropriation. Jackson v.
State Bar, 600 P.2d 1326 at 1328 (Cal.
1979). Most authorities recommend dis-
barment, even when the attorney con-
verts funds in only a single instance and
makes full restitution to the client. In re
McCormick, 576 P.2d 371 at 373 (Ore.
1978).
Non-Monetary
A. Property - The same principles
that apply to client funds apply to client
property. The only distinction, as a prac-
tical matter, is the depository in which
the property is kept. Non-monetary
property that must be identified, labeled
and secured pursuant to DR 9-102(B)(2)
include titles to real estate, securities and
valuables.
In Matter of Grubb, 663 P.2d 1346
(Wash. 1983), the attorney was given a
ring as security for his fees. He took it out
of his strong box several times, carried it
home to show his wife and ultimately lost
it. The attorney failed to notify his client
for two years, resulting in the attorney
being disciplined.
While there are some instances of
attorney misconduct where mitigation of
punishment is properly considered, trust
fund violations is not one of them. Chief
Justice Wilentz of the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated it most bluntly
when he, on behalf of a majority court,
said "lest there be any doubt, attorneys
who steal will be disbarred in New
Jersey."
Judge Wilentz goes out of his way to
render useless various factors, including
restitution, which are sometimes used in
mitigating these types of cases. More-
over, he states that the difference
between "borrowing" from trust funds
and stealing is "negligible" for the pur-
poses of imposing discipline. In re
Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153 (1979). This opin-
ion should lay to rest the senseless notion
that since the client suffered no apparent
damage, no violation occurred.
Conclusion
The rules pertaining to the preserva-
tion, identity and safekeeping of client
funds are, on their face, clear and easy to
understand. There are no issues of
culpability or intent to decide. There are
no shades of gray in which to get bogged
down. Failure to recommend severe dis-
cipline for any attorney who violates DR
9-102 is to merely wink at those who
exploit the professional trust bestowed
upon our profession, while the fabric of
public confidence continues to erode.
"Videotaped evidence from Electronic pre-trial preparations and the actual
News Services convinced the jury. I trial. Our computer-indexed library
won the case, and my client was contains more than 30,000 hours of
satisfied. I'm convinced of the value of videotaped news.
videotape in the courtroom." Contact us next time you have an
- A Well-Known Houston Lawyer important case. Call Joe Gaston in
Electronic News Clipping Services
can help you, too. With an audio-
visual library of network news and
other news stories dating back to 1979,
we provide timely, convincing facts -
facts that don't change between your
Houston at (713) 523-6410 or in Dallas
at (214) 351-1548. Or write to:
ELECTRONIC NEWS
SERVICES, Inc.
6715 Stella Link e Houston, TX 77005
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It's not too soon
to start thinking about
your holiday gift list
Call for your free
West's® Holiday Catalog today!
CALL T1vW- FKE_ead start on your holiday shopping is Many legal professionals 'I (300) _Z38- "32-
d easy. You'll find unique and appropriate have found that these law-
gifts for everyone on your personal and related cards and gifts standal lists in Wesqt'.s Holiday Cafalnnn , .. .. +i .... ; ,...........
There are dozens of items, from the urbane to the
unassuming, from the practical to the thought-
. provoking. Some are particularly
- appropriate for use in 1987, the
Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.
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PUBLISHING
COMPANY 01986 West Publishing Company
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merchandise. They are more
personal, more professional-
and better remembered.
Call toll free, 1 (800) 328-9352
to get your free catalog today.
And have your shopping out of








H. Dale Bailey, a resident of
Oklahoma, was disbarred by the 53rd
Judicial District Court of Travis County
on April 11, 1986. On Aug. 21, 1985,
Bailey was convicted of misapplication
of fiduciary property, a felony offense,
by the 47th Judicial District Court of
Randall County. Bailey received defer-
red adjudication probation.
Kenneth Guest, an attorney of
Houston, was disbarred by default judg-
ment of the 281st Judicial District Court
of Harris County for misappropriating
client funds. The court also found that
Guest intentionally neglected the cases of
10 clients. The disbarment became final
May 13,1986.
Suspensions
Harry Gonzales, attorney of Houston,
agreed to a 60-day suspension on April
25. The suspension was effective from
May 25 to July 25. The District 4-G
Grievance Committee found that the
attorney engaged in conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice and
adversely reflected on his fitness to prac-
tice law. He failed to obtain the consent
of his client to employ another attorney
or to disclose the division of attorney's
fees with the other attorney, failed to
withdraw from employment in a pro-
ceeding before a tribunal without its per-
mission, failed to take reasonable steps to
avoid foreseeable prejudice to his client,
failed to refund to his client any part of a
fee paid in advance that was not earned,
handled a legal matter without prepara-
tion adequate in the circumstances,
willfully or intentionally neglected a
legal matter entrusted to him, inten-
tionally failed to seek the legal objectives
of his client through reasonably available
means permitted by law, intentionally
failed to carry out a contract of employ-
ment entered into with a client, and
intentionally prejudiced or damaged his
client during the course of the profes-
sional relationship.
Paul Chitwood of Dallas was sus-
pended from the practice of law for 30
days pursuant to an agreed judgment of
the 162nd Judicial District Court of
Dallas County. The court found that
Chitwood failed to seek securing an
occupational driver's license for a client
and failed to respond to the grievance.
The suspension was effective June 1 to
July 1.
Ralph Shepherd, Hempstead attorney,
formerly of Houston, was suspended for
two years by the 9th District Court of
Waller County after a jury found that
Shepherd signed a deed of trust knowing
that a constructive trust had been
imposed in favor of a third party on the
property that he gave as security and he
accepted real property as a fee knowing
that his client had fraudulently obtained
such property. The court also based its
judgment upon jury findings that Shep-
herd charged a clearly excessive fee,
intentionally neglected his client's law-
suit, and deceived his client in causing
him to sign a deed. Shepherd's suspen-
sion began May 2,1986.
Gerald Sprague Smith, attorney of
Hereford, was suspended for 90 days by
virtue of an agreed judgment entered by
the 222nd Judicial District Court of Deaf
Smith County on June 16, 1986. The
court found that Smith testified falsely
under oath during an official proceeding
of the grievance committee. The court
further found that Smith had accepted
private employment in matters in which
he had substantial responsibility while he
was a public employee in violation of DR
9-101(B). Smith also had presented, par-
ticipated in presenting, or threatened to
present criminal charges solely to obtain
an advantage in a civil matter, in vio-
lation of DR 7-105(A).
Billy James Langston, a resident of
Nueces County, has been suspended
from the practice of law during his pro-
bation for the offense of theft. Langston
was placed on deferred adjudication pro-
bation for two years by the Judge of the
36th Judicial District Court of San
Patricio County. The probation for the
conviction of theft is effective from Dec.
16, 1985, to Dec. 16, 1987.
Gerald H. Klossner of San Marcos
agreed to a 90-day suspension from the
practice of law beginning May 29, 1986.
The District 15-C Grievance Committee
found that Klossner failed to preserve the
identity of funds of a client as required by
Disciplinary Rule 9-102(A).
Pat H. Everitt, attorney of Arlington,
was suspended by the 96th Judicial Dis-
trict Court of Tarrant County for six
months. The court found that Everitt
intentionally neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him and practiced law at a
time he was administratively suspended
for nonpayment of Bar dues. Everitt's
suspension became effective June 15,
1986.
Robert L. Vickers, attorney of Harris
County, agreed to a 120-day suspension
from the practice of law effective May 1,
1986. The District 4-A Grievance Com-
mittee found that Vickers engaged in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation, and
engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice, and
engaged in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Joel Bailey, a Dallas attorney, has been
suspended from the practice of law effec-
tive April 15 by judgment of the 190th
Judicial District Court of Dallas County,
which found Bailey to have violated Dis-
ciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4); 6-101(A)(1),
(2), and (3); 7-101(A)(1), (2), and (3); and
Article X, Section 7(4) of the State Bar
Rules. Bailey's suspension was set at one
year with the possibility of reduction to
one month if he reimburses the State Bar
of Texas $4,000 by June 15, to cover the
cost of the suit.
Med il an Hosp ita
embelg6xperts a specialies,
Edith L. James of Austin has been sus-
pended from the practice of law for three
years beginning May 1, 1986, and ending
April 30, 1989. The court found that the
attorney failed to appear at a trial setting
on behalf of a client, failed to determine
the status of her client's case after the date
of the trial setting and failed to preserve
his right of appeal. Further, the court
determined that she made incorrect state-
ments of fact in a motion for continuance
and advised her client to file a petition
under the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act which petition did not state a
cause of action under the Act.
On April 22, Averil Sweitzer of Dallas
was placed on a probated suspension
pursuant to an agreed judgment of the
101st Judicial District Court of Dallas
County. The court found that Sweitzer
had placed advertisements which were
false and misleading, failed to designate
which lawyer would be responsible for
the particular areas of law advertised,
and failed to include a disclaimer of
Board of Specialization certification.
Public Reprimands
Glen Mitchell Williams, an attorney of
Lubbock, agreed to a public reprimand
on April 22. The District 16-A Grievance
Committee found that the attorney failed
to carry out a contract of employment
entered into with a client for professional
services; willfully neglected a legal mat-
ter entrusted to him; handled the legal
matter without preparation adequate in
the circumstances; failed to adequately
inform his client during the course of his
representation; and prejudiced or
damaged his client during the course of
the professional relationship.
Richard Acevedo, an attorney of San
Antonio, accepted a public reprimand on
April 23. The District 10 Grievance Com-
mittee found that the attorney failed to
appear at a designated time for trial and
failed to inform his client of the trial set-
ting. As a result of the attorney's failure
to appear, the client was subsequently
arrested for failure to appear for trial.
Correction
On page 736 of the July 1986
Texas Bar Journal, we stated
that a private reprimand was
issued to an attorney from
Leon County. The attorney
should have been identified as
a McLennan County attorney.
We regret the error.
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Manuel V. Lopez, an attorney of San
Antonio, consented to a public repri-
mand on May 12. The District 10 Griev-
ance Committee found that the attorney
willfully or intentionally neglected a
legal matter entrusted to him, failed to
seek the lawful objectives of his client
through reasonably available means per-
mitted by law, and refused to timely
respond and cooperate with the griev-
ance committee.
William Jacobs, Jr., attorney of
Dallas, consented to a public reprimand
on May 5,1986. The District 6 Grievance
Committee found that the attorney failed
to respond to two grievances filed against
him.
Stephen Meeks, attorney of Fort
Worth, agreed to a public reprimand on
April 28, 1986. The District 7-A Griev-
ance Committee found that Meeks
willfully and intentionally neglected a
legal matter entrusted to him.
Private Reprimands
An attorney of Dallas agreed to a pri-
vate reprimand on April 25. The District
6 Grievance Committee found that the
attorney neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him, undertook a matter
that he was not competent to handle and
engaged in a course of action prejudicial
to the administration of justice.
An attorney of Dallas agreed to a pri-
vate reprimand on May 2. The District 6
Grievance Committee found that the
attorney refused to cooperate with and
furnish information to the committee.
On April 16, a Dallas attorney
accepted a private reprimand. The Dis-
trict 6 Grievance Committee Committee
found the attorney committed inten-
tional neglect and failed to promptly
return unused filing fee money when
demanded by the client.
An attorney of Dallas accepted a pri-
vate reprimand on May 5. The District 6
Grievance Committee found that the
attorney did not adequately prepare and
handle a legal matter entrusted to him.
A Houston attorney agreed to a pri-
vate reprimand on May 27. The District
4-H Grievance Committee found that the
attorney willfully and/or intentionally
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him,
failed to carry out a contract of employ-
ment entered into with a client for profes-
sional services, and prejudiced and/or
damaged his client during the course of
the professional relationship.
An Austin attorney received a private
reprimand from the 261st Judicial Dis-
trict Court on May 1. The court found
that the attorney failed to appear at a
hearing in a driver's license suspension
case of a client and then informed the
client he would have to pay an additional
fee for filing an appeal.
A Houston attorney agreed to a pri-
vate reprimand. The District 4-F Griev-
ance Committee found that the attorney
was engaged to handle a personal injury
claim and thereafter failed to pursue this
claim.
An attorney of Houston accepted a
private reprimand on May 8. The Dis-
trict 4-H Grievance Committee found
that the attorney withdrew from employ-
ment and failed to promptly deliver to his
client as requested by his client the prop-
erties in his possession which his client
was entitled to receive.
An attorney of Wichita County agreed
to a private reprimand on March 17. The
District 14-A Grievance Committee
found that the attorney willfully or inten-
tionally neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him in failing to file an
appellate brief in his indigent criminal
client's behalf.
An attorney of Dallas agreed to a pri-
vate reprimand on April 3. The District 6
Grievance Committee found that the
attorney did not comply with a client's
request for the return of a file.
An attorney of Houston agreed to a
private reprimand on May 6. The Dis-
trict 4-D Grievance Committee con-
cluded that the attorney failed to furnish
information requested by the grievance
committee or to assert the grounds for
failure to do so in a timely manner. The
committee also found that the attorney
willfully neglected a legal matter
entrusted to her, failed to carry out a
contract of employment entered into
with a client for professional services,
and failed to refund promptly a fee paid
in advance that had not been earned
upon withdrawing from employment.
An attorney of Cleburne consented to
a private reprimand on June 9. The Dis-
trict 7-B Grievance Committee found
that the attorney handled a legal matter
without preparation adequate in the cir-
cumstances.
An attorney of Dallas consented to a
private reprimand on May 5. The Dis-
trict 6 Committee found that the attorney
was employed to represent a client in
three criminal cases and that the attorney
neglected the legal matters entrusted to
him.
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cancellation, a $100 per person booking/
administration fee is non-refundable unless
another member of the firm attends in your
place. Airfare is not included but is available
at special reduced rates below "super saver"
fares. Applications for air ticketing will be
sent with your confirmation, or call
Americana Travel Center at 1-800-231-6028;
In Illinois call 312-441-7766. Please allow
10-14 days for processing. Strategic Media
Counselors acts solely as agent in all matters
concerning transportation, accommodations,
activities and meals included in the program,
and by enrolling the registrant agrees
Strategic Media Counselors will have no
responsibility or liability regarding any
aspect of any such service.
Strategic Media Counselors
TM
300 Inwood Drive, Suite 507
Wheeling, IL 60090
312/506-9063
America's largest and most complete media
relations firm serving the legal profession
exclusively. Our staff's credentials include
public affairs, communications and media
relations for the American Bar Association
and state and local bar associations; public
relations counsel for "Fortune 500" clients
and professional sports teams; broadcast
management and production.
© 1986 Strategic Media Counselors'"
HURRY - participation in this exclusive
Symposium is being reserved right now.




La Posada Resort Hot
October 8-11, 1986
Complete and Return I
PLEASE PRINT
Attorney: Mr Mrs Ms




Attach separate sheet to list additional
CHECK PROGRAM CHOICE
C1 Attorney Complete - $700 thru 9/8/86; $775 thereafI Spouse/Guest - $275 thru 9/8/86; $300 thereafterI 1 Check is enclosed Charge: 0 VISA
Account #
Auth. Signature






e1 - Scottsdale, AZ
to: Strategic Media Counselors
300 Inwood Drive, Suite 507
Wheeling, IL 60090 312/506-9063
State Zip
registrants.
ter 0 Attorney Basic - $400 thru 9/8/86; $425 thereafter
0 MASTERCARD TOTAL FEE: $
Exp. Date
Phone(
Please send me your free Symposium brochure.
September1986 Texas Bar Journal 859
WHY IS IT THAT TICOR
STANDS OUT INA CROWD?
Perhaps being the nation's largest title insurer
makes us easy to spot.
Or having the largest combined capital,
surplus and reserves of any title insurer gives us
more dimension. So we can underwrite up to 50%
more than other title companies on any single
policy without outside reinsurance.
Having the largest underwriting staff in the
industry also attracts a lot of attention.
Especially when it's made up of experts who
have more specialized knowledge than anybody
in the business.
And people are always on the lookout for a
title insurer that has a solid understanding of the
laws and customs unique to their area. And they
find that ability at Ticor Title, We can resolve more
questions about issuing a policy locally and quickly.
Without having to wait for some "risk committee"
to vote on insuring your transaction.
We bring together the resources and exper-
tise of a nationwide network consisting of over 2,500
offices, including over 2,000 independent agents, and
put it all to work for you.
How can you overlook that?
5 TICOR TITLE
